Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering by Chemerinsky, Erwin
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 4 Article 4
2000
Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for
Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering
Erwin Chemerinsky
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1143
(2000).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss4/4
ARTICLES
PROTECT THE PRESS: A FIRST AMENDMENT
STANDARD FOR SAFEGUARDING AGGRESSIVE
NEWSGATHERING
Erwin Chemerinsky *
I. INTRODUCTION
Few occu.pations or professions rank lower than reporters in
public esteem. In July 1999, Justice Stephen Breyer participated as
a panelist at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference and was
challenged by Associated Press reporter Linda Deutsch about the
absence of cameras in the Supreme Court. Justice Breyer explained
that the Court did not want to risk its relatively high level of public
esteem by placing itself on television. Justice Breyer noted the lack
of respect for the media and said that the Court did not want to see
its esteem ratings lowered to that of the press.
The audience's laughter at Justice Breyer's statement masked the
larger significance about the Court's attitude to the press. The
Supreme Court's low esteem for the press, which is shared by judges
at all levels, is reflected in constitutional doctrine.1 The judiciary,
at all levels of courts, has refused to provide any special protection
for newsgathering activities by the press.
The failure to provide protection is reflected in recent court cases
holding the media liable for the surreptitious use of cameras in
undercover reporting. Recently, in Sanders v. American Broadcast-
ing Cos.,2 the Supreme Court of California held that a media
company could be held liable for invasion of privacy for an under-
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science,
University of Southern California. I want to thank Nick Alexander, Autumn Gresowski, and
Lee Rawles for their excellent research assistance.
1. See Allison Lynn Tuley, Note, Outtakes, Hidden Cameras, and the First Amendment
Privilege: A Reporter's Privilege, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1817, 1819 (1997) (arguing that
courts are biased against television reporter work product). I would agree with Tuley as to
the bias, but argue that it exists against all the press, print and broadcast alike.
2. 978 P.2d. 67 (Cal. 1999).
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cover television news reporter's covert videotaping that exposed
fraud by a telepsychic company. Similarly, in Food Lion, Inc. v.
Capital Cities /ABC, Inc.,4 a federal district court upheld a jury's
finding of liability against a media company for the undercover
reporters' use of hidden cameras to expose unsafe practices by a food
chain.5 The jury found the defendants liable for fraud, trespass, and
breach of the duty of loyalty and awarded $1,402 in compensatory
damages and a total of $5,545,750 in punitive damages.6 The
district court reduced the award of punitive damages to $50,000
against the corporate parent, $250,000 against the network, and
$7,500 each from the executive producer and senior producer.7
Although the Fourth Circuit recently reversed the amount of
punitive damages, it relied on state tort law and did not find the
damages to violate the First Amendment.8
These cases are reflective of the lack of judicial protection for
newsgathering by the press. Surprisingly, most scholars have
defended the courts' approach, though some have urged a limit on
punitive damages awards, while a few have argued for much more
protection for the press.9 The consensus, though, appears to be that
the media is liable when it commits torts such as intrusion and
invasion of privacy, even when its actions are necessary to expose
serious threats to the public's health and safety.
In this article, I challenge that consensus and argue for greater
First Amendment protection for newsgathering by the media. In
particular, there is a need for First Amendment safeguards for
undercover media operations that serve an important public
purpose. Specifically, I argue that the application of general laws
3. See id. at 69-70.
4. 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
5. See id. at 939-40.
6. See id. at 927.
7. See id. at 938-39.
8. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 520-22 (4th Cir. 1999).
9. See, e.g.,RandallP. Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension Between
Exemption and Independence inNewsgathering by the Press, 47 EMoRYL.J. 895 (1998); David
A. Logan, Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious Newsgathering, 83
IOWA L. REV. 161 (1997); Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive Damages for
Newsgathering Torts and the Limitations of Current First Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 507 (1998); John J. Walsh et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The
Constitutionality of Consequential Damages for Publication ofIll-Gotten Information, 4 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 1111 (1996). But see Paul A. LeBel, The Constitutional Interest in
Getting the News: Towards a First Amendment Protection from Tort Liability for
Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145 (1996) (arguing for First
Amendment protection for newsgathering).
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to impose media liability should be required to meet, at least,
intermediate scrutiny and thus only be upheld if it is proven to be
substantially related to achieve an important government purpose.
In Part II of this article, I argue that current doctrine provides no
constitutional protection for newsgathering. This trend is reflected
in both Supreme Court decisions and recent lower court rulings
concerning undercover media operations. In Part III, I argue in
favor of greater First Amendment protection for newsgathering and
specifically advocate the use of at least intermediate scrutiny when
laws of general applicability are used to create media liability for
reporting activity. Based on this test, I contend that recent rulings
in cases such as Sanders and Food Lion were wrongly decided.
II. THE FAILURE TO PROTECT NEWSGATHERING
The Supreme Court has proclaimed that "without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated." 0 The Court likewise has declared that "the First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-
expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the
stock of information from which members of the public may draw.""
These pronouncements, however, are empty rhetoric from the
Court. Its rulings, without exception, have failed to provide any
First Amendment protection for newsgathering. Indeed, the Court
has declared that there is no exemption for the press from general
laws. In other words, while engaged in newsgathering, the press is
not exempt from tort liability or criminal laws, no matter how
compelling the need for reporting to protect the public's health and
safety.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.'2 offers the strongest statement by the
Court that the press is not exempt from general laws. In Cohen, a
newspaper published the identity of a source who was promised that
his name would not be disclosed.'" The Court rejected the argument
that holding the newspaper liable for breach of contract would
violate the First Amendment.'4 The Court stressed that the case
10. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
11. First Natl Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
12. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
13. See id. at 665-66.
14. See id. at 672.
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involved the application of a general law that in no way was
motivated by a desire to interfere with the press. 5 The Court said:
[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on
its ability to gather and report the news .... [E]nforcement of such
general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than
would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organiza-
tions.16
This philosophy, that laws of general applicability can be used
against the press when it is engaged in newsgathering, is reflected
in two major sets of Supreme Court decisions: (1) efforts by the
media to protect confidential sources and (2) efforts by the media to
gain access to places. In both areas, the Court has rejected protec-
tion for newsgathering under the First Amendment.
In Branzburg v. Hayes,'" the Court expressly rejected a privilege
for journalists to keep their sources confidential. 8 Branzburg
presented several cases to the Court where reporters had refused to
appear before state and federal grand juries and disclose the
identity of confidential sources. 9 In a 5-4 decision, with the
majority opinion written by Justice White, the Court rejected the
claim that the First Amendment creates a shield for reporters that
immunizes them from having to disclose their sources.2 °
Although the Court spoke of the need for constitutional protection
for newsgathering,2' the Court also said that "the First Amendment
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access
to information not available to the public generally."2 2 Justice White
noted that the press is regularly kept from many places from which
the public is excluded, ranging from grand jury proceedings to the
Supreme Court's conferences to crime and disaster scenes. 3
The Court concluded that "the public interest in law enforcement
and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings"24 is sufficient "to
15. See id. at 670.
16. Id. at 669-70.
17. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
18. See id. at 702-03.
19. See id. at 668-79.
20. See id. at 702-03.
21. See id. at 681.
22. Id. at 684.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 690.
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override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on newsgathering
that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other
citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of
a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial."25
Justice Powell, the fifth vote in the majority, wrote a concurring
opinion in which he urged that a balancing test be used in particular
cases to decide whether the First Amendment protected the ability
of the press to keep its sources confidential. 6 Powell said that:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal
interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional
way of adjudicating such questions.'
Some lower courts have relied on Justice Powell's concurring opinion
as the crucial fifth vote creating a reporter's privilege, while other
courts have rejected this position and found that no such privilege
exists under the First Amendment."
The Branzburg decision reflects the principle described above that
the press is not entitled to exemptions from general laws; anyone
else would have to answer questions from a grand jury, so a reporter
must also do so. But Branzburg can be criticized for failing to give
adequate weight-or any weight-to the importance of confidential
sources in informing the public and, at times, checking government.
Although the Court was correct that there is not empirical proof of
how many sources would vanish without assurances of confidential-
ity, this is something that would be impossible to measure. In fact,
the Court has accepted the importance of other privileges, such as
the attorney-client privilege, even though it is impossible to prove
25. Id. at 690-91.
26. See id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
27. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
28. Compare, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting a reporter's privilege under the First Amendment), with Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding a reporter's privilege). See also RODNEYA.
SMoLLA, SMOLLAANDNIMMERON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, §§ 25:19 n.2 to :26 n.27 (3d ed. 1996)
(listing cases accepting and rejecting a reporter's privilege).
20001 1147
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
how many conversations would not occur without the promise of
confidentiality.29
The Supreme Court has followed Branzburg in other cases in
refusing to find a First Amendment exemption for the press in court
proceedings and law enforcement actions. ° In Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily,3 the Court upheld the ability of the police to search press
newsrooms to gather information to aid in criminal investigations.2
A student newspaper published stories about a violent confrontation
between students and the police at a demonstration.33 The police
then obtained a warrant to search the newspaper's offices for
negatives, films, and pictures that would help to identify the
demonstrators.34 The search was conducted, though it did not yield
any information that had not already been published. 5
The newspaper then sued the police for violating the First
Amendment.36 The Court held that the First Amendment does not
protect the press from valid searches pursuant to valid warrants.
Justice White, again writing for the Court and once more rejecting
the claim of any special protection for the press under the First
Amendment, noted that:
Properly administered, the preconditions for a warrant-probable cause,
specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, and overall reasonableness-should afford sufficient protection
against the harms that are assertedly threatened by warrants for
searching newspaper offices.
... Nor are we convinced, any more than we were in [Branzburg],
that confidential sources will disappear. 8
29. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 406 (1998) (holding that the
attorney-client privilege survives death and stressing the importance of the attorney-client
privilege in encouraging clients to speak candidly with their attorneys).
30. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169 (1979) (finding that the First
Amendment does not protect the press from having to answer questions concerning its
editorial process in defamation actions; the need for a public figure to prove "actual malice"
warrants requiring the press to answer the questions).
31. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
32. See id. at 568.
33. See id. at 551.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 551-52.
36. See id. at 552.
37. See id. at 567-68.
38. Id. at 565-66.
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Zurcher is obviously consistent with Branzburg and the other
cases that refuse to recognize special protection for the press. Yet
Zurcher is troubling because the search was not for evidence of any
crimes committed by the newspaper or its reporters; the police were
searching the newsroom so they could obtain the information that
the paper gathered as the press and use it in law enforcement.39
There is reason for concern that such searches would chill aggres-
sive reporting and the willingness of confidential sources to speak
to the press if their identity could be learned easily through the
search of a newsroom. For this reason, almost immediately after
Zurcher, Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act of 198040 to
protect the press from searches ofnewsrooms. The law prohibits law
enforcement officers or agents from engaging in searches of those
reasonably believed to be engaged in disseminating information to
the public unless there is probable cause to believe that the person
committed a crime or that giving notice by subpoena likely would
result in the loss of evidence.41
The other area where the Supreme Court has had the opportunity
to protect newsgathering is in cases involving a claim by the press
to a right of access to prisons to inform the public about prison
conditions and the treatment of prisoners. The Court has expressly
rejected such a right for the press and has specifically ruled that the
press is not entitled to any greater rights than the general public.42
In Pell v. Procunier43 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.," the Court
upheld state and federal prison regulations that prohibited press
interviews with particular inmates.45 The Court accepted the
government's claim that such interviews created a "star" within the
prison that undermined effective discipline and order.46 The Court
in Pell also more generally declared: "The First and Fourteenth
Amendments bar government from interfering in any way with a
free press. The Constitution does not, however, require government
to accord to the press special access to information not shared by
members of the public generally.' 7 The Court expressly rejected the
39. See id. at 551 (stating the purpose for the search warrant used by the officers).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).
43. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
44. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
45. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
46. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 831-32; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 848-49.
47. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834.
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view that "the Constitution imposes upon government the affirma-
tive duty to make available to journalists sources of information not
available to members of the public generally."4"
The Court followed this reasoning in Houchins v. KQED.4 s In
Houchins, the press sought access to the Greystone facility in the
Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita.5" The jail had a no-access policy
except for monthly official tours of the facility.5' The press sought
access to the jail to report on its conditions.52 The plurality opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger rejected the media's claim and again
emphasized the lack of any special right of access for the press
under the First Amendment.53 The Chief Justice wrote:
This Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a
right of access to all sources of information within governmental
control.
There is an undoubted right to gather news "from any source by
means within the law," but that affords no basis for the claim that the
First Amendment compels others-private persons or government-to
supply information.54
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, explicitly declared that
the press is entitled to no greater privileges than the general
public.55 He wrote:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a
right of access to information generated or controlled by government,
nor do they guarantee the press any basic right of access superior to
that of the public generally. The Constitution does no more than assure
the public and the press equal access once government has opened its
doors.5"
48. Id.
49. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). Houchins was a 4-3 decision, with two Justices not participating.
The majority's opinion consisted of a plurality of three and a concurring opinion written by
Justice Stewart.
50. See id. at 3.
51. See id. at 4-5.
52. See id. at 3-5.
53. See id. at 9-11.
54. Id. at 9, 11 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972)).
55. See id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
56. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
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This opinion is notable because Justice Stewart, in other writings,
has urged special protection for the press under the First Amend-
ment.57
Thus Houchins, like the other prison cases, contains strong
language rejecting a First Amendment right of access to government
places and any preferred rights for the press. Yet Houchins can be
criticized for failing to recognize the importance of the press in
informing the public about prison conditions. Without press access
to the prisoners and prison facilities, the public might never learn
of serious abusive conditions and be able to hold this aspect of
government accountable.
Indeed, the only area where the Court has recognized a First
Amendment right of access to government proceedings is in criminal
trials.58 In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,59 the Court held that
there is a First Amendment right for the public and the press to
attend criminal trials.6" AlthoughRichmond Newspapers and subse-
quent cases hold that the press and public have a First Amendment
right to attend criminal proceedings, they do not hold that the press
has a preferred right of access to judicial proceedings. If there are
only a limited number of seats in a courtroom, must some of them
be reserved for reporters? The values underlying the First Amend-
ment would seem to require this because the public can only learn
about what occurred in court if the press is present to observe and
report.
But the Court has not yet recognized a preferred right for the
press and has generally rejected any special protections for the
press.6 In fact, in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,2 the Court held
that the press did not have a right of access to information produced
in discovery in a civil suit that was covered by a protective order.6
Specifically, the press wanted to obtain a list of contributors to a
controversial religious organization.' The Court unanimously ruled
against the newspaper and said that the press was not entitled to
the information because the public would not have had a right to
57. See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636-37 (1975).
58. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980).
59. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
60. See id. at 580-81.
61. See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984).
62. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
63. See id. at 37.
64. See id. at 24-25.
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it.65 The Court concluded that "where . . .a protective order is
entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is
limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict
the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources,
it does not offend the First Amendment."66
The Supreme Court's refusal to protect newsgathering under the
First Amendment is reflected in the decisions of lower courts. Most
notably, in recent years, courts have held that the First Amendment
does not shield the media from tort liability for the undercover
activities of reporters who expose fraud and threats to public health
and safety.
In Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities IABC, Inc.,67 a jury awarded
compensatory and large punitive damages for the undercover
actions of reporters who surreptitiously videotaped conduct in the
workplace that threatened public health.68 PrimeTime Live had two
of its undercover reporters apply for jobs at Food Lion, Inc., a major
supermarket chain.69 Lynne Litt, an investigative journalist, and
Susan Barnett, an associate producer at ABC, had independently
received information concerning Food Lion's practices."° The two
PrimeTime Live employees obtained jobs with Food Lion by
submitting false information on employment applications, including
false employment backgrounds, false references, and other false
documentation.7
Once they were hired, each of the PrimeTime Live employees wore
a hidden microphone while on the job and recorded some of the
events that took place.72 They worked at Food Lion for approxi-
mately ten days and recorded significant activity that threatened
public health, including changing the expiration dates on meat so as
to allow its sale and dirty, unhealthy conditions. The reporters
also found that Food Lion ground out-of-date beef together with new
beef and bleached rank beef to remove its odor. 4 Of the forty-five
65. See id. at 37.
66. Id.
67. 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
68. See id. at 510.
69. See id.
70. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811,814 (M.D.N.C. 1995)
(ruling on defendant's motions to dismiss).
71. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 510.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 511.
74. See id.
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hours of tape obtained, five to six minutes of the footage were in a
report broadcast on the ABC television show.75 PrimeTime Live's
producers indicated that the show would not have aired without the
footage.76 The district court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss.77 The jury returned a verdict finding the defendants liable
for fraud, trespass, and breach of the duty of loyalty and awarded
Food Lion $1,402 in compensatory damages and a total of
$5,545,750 in punitive damages.78 The district court reduced the
award of punitive damages to $50,000 against the corporate parent,
$250,000 against the network, and $7,500 each from the executive
producer and senior producer.79
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision in part and reversed in part.8"
The Fourth Circuit reversed the large award of punitive damages,
but it did so entirely based on its interpretation of state tort law and
not the First Amendment."1 The Fourth Circuit reversed the finding
of fraud against ABC, concluding that "the district court erred in
upholding the verdict on this claim because Food Lion did not prove
injury caused by a reasonable reliance on the misrepresentations
made by [the ABC reporters] on their job applications." 2 The
Fourth Circuit explained that the "main component" of Food Lion's
fraud claim was its costs resulting from employing the reporters.83
The court concluded that the harms to Food Lion resulted almost
entirely from the reporters' working for just a short time." The
court said that since they were at-will employees, they could have
been fired or quit at any time. 5
The court stressed that "[t]heir performance was at a level
suitable to their status as new, entry-level employees." Thus, the
court said that the reporters "were not paid their wages because of
misrepresentations on their job applications. Food Lion therefore
cannot assert wage payment to satisfy the injurious reliance
75. See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 816.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 824.
78. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923,927 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
79. See id. at 940.
80. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 510.
81. See id. at 522.
82. Id. at 512.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 512-13.
85. See id. at 513.
86. Id. at 514.
115320003
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element of fraud. The fraud verdict must be reversed." 7 The
punitive damages were reversed because they were based on the
fraud claim."8
The Fourth Circuit, however, did uphold the liability against the
defendants for breach of the duty of loyalty and for trespass.8 9 Most
importantly, the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected ABC's First
Amendment defense to liability.9" The court relied on Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. and held that liability was constitutionally
permissible because it was pursuant to laws of general
applicability.9' The court explained that the torts of "breach of duty
of loyalty and trespass fit neatly into the Cowles framework.
Neither tort targets or singles out the press. Each applies to the
daily transactions of the citizens of North and South Carolina."92
The court concluded that "[h]ere, as in Cowles, heightened scrutiny
does not apply because the tort laws (breach of loyalty and trespass)
do not single out the press or have more than an incidental effect
upon its work."93
Although the Fourth Circuit's decision in Food Lion is regarded
as a victory for the press because the court overturned the large
punitive damages judgment, actually the ruling provides no
constitutional protection for newsgathering. In fact, the court
upheld state tort law liability for breach of the duty of loyalty and
for trespass.96
In Sanders v. American Broadcasting Cos.,95 the Supreme Court
of California unanimously held that undercover reporters could be
held liable for the tort of intrusion.9" Stacy Lescht, an ABC reporter,
obtained employment as a "telepsychic" with the Psychic Marketing
Group ("PMG"). 97 While working at PMG, Lescht wore a small video
camera hidden in her hat and covertly taped her conversations with
several coworkers, including Mark Sanders.9
87. Id.
88. See id. at 522.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 520.
91. See id. (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)).
9a. Id. at 521.
93. Id. at 522.
94. See id.
95. 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
96. See id. at 77.
97. See id. at 70.
98. See id.
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Lescht and ABC were sued by Sanders on several grounds,
including the tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion.99 The focus of
the suit was two conversations between Sanders and Lescht. The
trial court rejected the defendants' motion to dismiss and ruled that
Sanders could proceed on the theory that a limited right of privacy
existed in the workplace that prohibited a journalist from covertly
videotaping his actions, even though his communications with the
journalist could have been witnessed and may have been overheard
by coworkers.' The jury found the defendant liable for invasion of
privacy by intrusion and awarded compensatory damages of
$335,000 and punitive damages of $300,000.'0'
The California Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on the
ground that Sanders had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
conversations because they could be overheard by others. 102 The
Supreme Court of California reversed the court of appeals and held
that the media could be held liable for surreptitious taping in the
workplace. 0 3 The court stated:
In an office or other workplace to which the general public does not
have unfettered access, employees may enjoy a limited, but legitimate
expectation that their conversations and other interactions will not be
secretly videotaped by undercover television reporters, even though
those conversations may not have been completely private from the
participants' coworkers."'
The court did not reject the possibility of a First Amendment limit
on liability. The court said, "[niothing we say here prevents a media
defendant from attempting to show, in order to negate the offensive-
ness element of the intrusion tort, that the claimed intrusion, even
if it infringed on a reasonable expectation of privacy, was 'justified
by the legitimate motive of gathering the news.'"' 5 The court did
not elaborate on the content or scope of a possible First Amendment
defense.
Food Lion and Sanders are recent cases allowing liability for
undercover reporting; earlier cases followed the same approach. In
99. See id. at 69.
100. See id. at 70.
101. See id. at 70-71.
102. See id. at 71.
103. See id. at 77.
104. Id. at 69.
105. Id. at 77 (quoting Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998)).
11552000]
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Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,' the Ninth Circuit affirmed a finding of
invasion of privacy and intrusion against reporters for Life maga-
zine.' °7 The reporters used deception to gain access to the home of
an individual who claimed to be able to heal disease with the use of
clay, minerals, and herbs.' 8 The reporters surreptitiously took
pictures and recorded conversations that were then used in a
magazine story.'0 9 The subject of the story was later arrested for
practicing medicine without a license."0
The magazine and its reporters appealed the judgment, contend-
ing that the imposition of liability violated the First Amendment."'
The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected this claim:
We agree that newsgathering is an integral part of news dissemina-
tion. We strongly disagree, however, that the hidden mechanical
contrivances are indispensable tools' of newsgathering.... The First
Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity
from torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering.
The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude
by lectronic means into the precincts of another's home or office. It
does not become such a license simply because the person subjected to
the intrusion is reasonably suspected of committing a crime.112
Nor have courts followed this reasoning just when the intrusion was
into the home, as in Dietemann. In Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System," 3 a New York appellate court upheld a
damage award against a reporter and camera crew that visited
restaurants to expose health code violations." 4 The %reporter and
photographer in Le Mistral did not engage in surreptitious videotap-
ing and entered a place open to the public." 5
There are very few cases that have protected the media from
liability for aggressive newsgathering. The leading case rejecting
liability is Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos. "' In Desnick,
106. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
107. See id. at 250.
108. See id. at 245-46.
109. See id. at 246.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 249.
112. Id.
113. 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
114. See id. at 818.
115. See id. at 816; see also Huskey v. National Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1291-92
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding the media liable for invasion of privacy).
116. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
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investigative journalists working for PrimeTime Live posed as
patients at an opthalmic clinic and surreptitiously videotaped their
examinations with hidden cameras and microphones.11 ' The
program sent seven individuals, with concealed cameras, to the
doctors' offices to investigate allegations that they were recommend-
ing and performing unnecessary cataract surgery."8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in an
opinion by Chief Judge Posner, rejected the plaintiffs' claims of
trespass, invasion of privacy, and violation of state and federal
wiretap laws. 19 For example, the court found that there was no
trespass because there was consent to the individuals entry on to
the premises, and the court concluded that there was no claim for
invasion of privacy because no private information had been
revealed. 2 ° Chief Judge Posner wrote:
[If the broadcast.., does not contain actionable defamation, and no
established rights are invaded in the process of creating it (for the
media have no general immunity from tort or contract liability), then
the target has no legal remedy even if the investigatory tactics used by
the network are surreptitious, confrontational, unscrupulous, and
ungentlemanly.u 1
It is important to note that Desnick did not find that the First
Amendment shielded the media from tort liability. To the contrary,
the court rejected the notion that there is First Amendment
immunity for torts committed in newsgathering."2 ' Instead, the
Seventh Circuit interpreted the torts themselves in a manner as to
not allow liability.'
21
Thus, the Supreme Court and the lower courts consistently have
rejected First Amendment protection for newsgathering. Cases such
as Food Lion and Sanders are representative of an attitude and
approach that has been consistently followed.
117. See id. at 1348.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1351-54.
120. See id. at 1351-53.
121. Id. at 1355.
122. See id.
123. See id.
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III. PROTECTING NEWSGATHERING: A FIRST
AMENDMENT STANDARD
Academics who defend the absence of protection for news-
gathering do so by narrowly defining the scope of the Constitution's
protection for freedom of the press. In an especially thoughtful
article on the subject, Professor Randall P. Bezanson defended
holding ABC liable in the Food Lion case, and argued that the First
Amendment simply does not offer protection for the press in its
newsgathering activities.'24 Professor Bezanson writes:
The syllogism I would apply is: (1) freedom of the press means
independence from government in decisions about whether and what
to publish; (2) newsgathering, as such, has little to do with indepen-
dent editorial judgment, and is thus only incidentally related to press
freedom; (3) restrictions on newsgathering, if generally applicable, do
not threaten press independence, but restrictions applicable only to the
press, as well as exemptions directed narrowly to the press, do
threaten independence by making the press a formal and distinct legal
actor and by risking dependence, or entanglement, between the press
and government; and (4) generally applicable restrictions on
newsgathering should be presumed constitutional, with the press
bearing a heavy burden of proof to justify an exception or exemption,
much like civil disobedients must bear a heavy burden in making out
the defense of necessity.125
In this section, I disagree with Professor Bezanson's premise and
his conclusion. Unlike Professor Bezanson, I believe that the First
Amendment's protection for freedom of the press safeguards more
than just the ability to print what the press chooses. News-
gathering itself should be regarded as a First Amendment-protected
activity. As such, the presumption should be in favor of the media
and against liability, not, as Professor Bezanson would have it, the
other way around.
Although the Supreme Court has not followed it in its rulings, the
Court has declared that "without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."126 The press is not
engaged in newsgathering for its own sake; rather, of course,
124. See Bezanson, supra note 9.
125. Id. at 896-97 (footnotes omitted).
126. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
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newsgathering exists to provide the information that the press then
publishes.
Newsgathering thus directly serves core purposes of the First
Amendment. Above all, it is agreed that the First Amendment is
essential for the effective functioning of the political process.
Alexander Meiklejohn wrote that freedom of speech "is a deduction
from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be
decided by universal suffrage."127 He argued that "[sielf-government
can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence,
integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare
that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express."2 " News-
gathering can gain information about government and the political
process that would not otherwise be available.
Professor Vincent Blasi argued that freedom of speech serves an
essential "checking value" on government.'29 He wrote that free
speech checks the abuse of power by public officials and said that
through speech voters "retain a veto power to be employed when the
decisions of officials pass certain bounds." 3 ° Freedom of the press
in general, and aggressive newsgathering in particular, directly
advances this checking function. If newsgathering is protected, the
media might gain information that would not otherwise be avail-
able.
The First Amendment, of course, is not limited to protecting
speech related to the political process. Speech can benefit people
with information relevant to all aspects of life. The media, through
newsgathering, can obtain information and then disseminate it to
the public. The cases described in Part II are striking in terms of
the public benefit of the information gathered. In Food Lion, the
reporters documented unsafe practices in a major supermarket
chain, including changing the expiration date after the product was
no longer salable. Such practices threaten public health.'' Sanders
involved purported psychics who were fraudulently taking money
from people. 32 The earlier cases, Dietemann and Le Mistral,
127. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27
(1948).
128. Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is anAbsolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
255 (1966).
129. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FouND. RES. J. 523 (1977).
130. Id. at 542 (footnote omitted).
131. See supra notes 67-94 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
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involved, respectively, a person practicing medicine without a
license and health code violations at a restaurant.3 3 There is
enormous public benefit in exposing such threats. This public
benefit is unlikely to occur except through the media and undercover
reporting techniques.
Indeed, this fulfills a central purpose of the First Amendment:
informing people about matters important to their lives. In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,13 the Court explained that commercial speech is protected by
the First Amendment because of its significance in people's lives.
35
The Court declared unconstitutional a Virginia law that prohibited
pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs.3 6
Justice Blackmun's opinion stressed the importance of commercial
speech:
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate .... When drug prices
vary as strikingly'as they do, information as to who is charging what
becomes more than a convenience. It could mean the alleviation of
physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities.13 7
Speech is protected because it matters in people's lives, and
aggressive newsgathering is often crucial to obtaining the informa-
tion. The very notion of a marketplace of ideas rests on the
availability of information.'38 Aggressive newsgathering, such as by
undercover reporters, is often the key to gathering the information.
People on their own cannot expose unhealthy practices in supermar-
kets or fraud by telemarketers or unnecessary surgery by doctors.
But the media can expose this, if it is allowed the tools to do so, and
the public directly benefits from the reporting.
The problem, though, is how to draw the line: What actions by
the media in newsgathering are permissible and which are imper-
missible? Protecting newsgathering cannot mean that the media
has license to violate any law or commit any tort. Yet nor should
the media be subjected to liability without respect to the impact on
133. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
134. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
135. See id. at 764.
136. See id. at 770.
137. Id. at 763-64.
138. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(providing a classic explanation of the marketplace of ideas metaphor).
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newsgathering. Thus there is a need to balance the media's interests
against the government's need for enforcing its criminal and tort
laws.
Many scholars have considered this issue and their proposals
range from allowing no exemptions for the press, to allowing
exemptions only in particularly compelling circumstances, to
allowing compensatory but not punitive damages, to applying
express balancing. I suggest another alternative, one that has been
largely absent from the voluminous law review literature on the
topic: the use of intermediate scrutiny. In other words, the
government should be able to impose liability on the media only if
it can prove that this is necessary to achieve an important govern-
ment purpose.
139
Indeed, using intermediate scrutiny in this context is consistent
with well-established First Amendment doctrine.14 The Court has
made it clear that general laws that burden First Amendment
activities must meet intermediate scrutiny. In Turner Broadcasting
System v. Federal Communication Commission,14 1 the Court said
that the general rule is that content-based restrictions on speech
must meet strict scrutiny, while content-neutral regulation only
need meet intermediate scrutiny. 42 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the Court, explained that "[g]overnment action that stifles speech on
account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular
message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential
[First Amendment] right."' Justice Kennedy thus noted, "[flor
these reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to narrow and
well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental
control over the content of messages expressed by private individu-
als."'" Hence, the Court endorsed a two-tier system of review. The
Court uses "the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because
of its content."'45 But, "fiun contrast, regulations that are unrelated
139. See, e.g., Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (defining intermediate scrutiny as
requiring the regulation "serve important governmental objectives and... be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives").
140. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. Federal Communication Connm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 662
(1994).
141. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
142. See id. at 662.
143. Id. at 641.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 642.
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to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny."'46
Imposing tort liability on the media for its newsgathering
activities is applying a content-neutral law in a manner that
burdens First Amendment conduct. Intermediate scrutiny is thus
appropriate. This is important because it explains why Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. is mistaken in holding that the First Amendment
cannot be used to challenge neutral laws of general applicability. 47
Turner Broadcasting is explicit that neutral laws burdening First
Amendment activities must meet intermediate scrutiny. In Cohen,
the Court expressly found that allowing breach of contract liability
for the broken promise of confidentiality would have only an
"insignificant" effect on the First Amendment.'48 Moreover, the
Court in Cohen stressed that the obligation on the press was self-
imposed by its own promise of secrecy. 149 Cohen thus stands for a
proposition that is quite different from tort liability for
newsgathering, which involves the government imposing significant
liability and creates significant constitutional implications.
Applying intermediate scrutiny in this area would place the
presumption in favor of the media when it is engaged in
newsgathering activity. Obviously, the press should not have
license to violate any criminal law or commit any tort simply
because it is gathering the news. Nor, though, should the Constitu-
tion fail to provide any protection to the media. The need is to
balance a state's interests, as reflected in its tort laws, against the
media's interest in newsgathering and the public's right to know.
A simple balancing test gives courts little guidance as to how to
weigh the competing interests. It also gives the media a relatively
minimal sense of what is likely to be held liable under what
circumstances. Applying intermediate scrutiny in this area informs
courts and the press that newsgathering is constitutionally pro-
tected unless it can be proven that there is an important interest
gained by allowing liability.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. For an excellent argument that it is incorrect to interpret Cohen as precluding
protection for newsgathering activities, see Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right:
Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta that Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135 (1997).
148. 501 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1991).
149. See id. at 671.
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Obviously, a state's general interest in enforcing its tort law
should not be regarded as sufficient to justify imposing liability.
This approach would eviscerate constitutional protection for
newsgathering. Instead, the question in any case must be whether
imposing liability would serve an important government interest.
In the cases described above, the public's interest in being
informed is much more significant than the state's interest in
upholding its tort law. In Food Lion, the public's interest in health
and safety is served by undercover reporting that documents a
supermarket chain engaging in dirty and dangerous practices. In
Sanders, the public's interest in exposing fraud is more important
than an intrusion by one coworker upon another's privacy. In
Dietemann, there is the public's interest in exposing a person
practicing medicine without a license. In none of these instances is
there an important interest sufficient to justify allowing tort
liability.
What would be the constitutionality of California's recently
adopted Privacy Protection Act' 50 under this standard?. 5' The law
creates liability for anyone who uses technological enhancement
equipment, such as telephoto lenses, to obtain images of personal or
family activity, where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy,
if the images otherwise only could have been gained through a
physical trespass."5 2 In other words, the California law applies only
if the following requirements are met: (a) images or sound must be
obtained through technological enhancement equipment; (b) the
images or sound must be of personal or family activity where there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (c) the images or sound
otherwise only could have been obtained through a physical
trespass. 5
3
Although the law is described as an anti-paparazzi statute, it
applies to all who engage in the activity described. Despite strongly
believing in First Amendment protection for newsgathering, I
believe that this law is constitutional. The government has an
important interest in protecting the privacy of the home. Fourth
Amendment cases have recognized the special privacy interests
150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West Cum. Supp. 1999).
151. I should disclose that I played a role in conceiving this law and assisted in the
legislative process, including testifying in favor of it.
152. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1708.8 (West Cum. Supp. 1999).
153. See id.
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surrounding the home.' Additionally, in the First Amendment
area, the Court has expressly protected the privacy of the home.'55
In Frisby v. Schultz, 6' the Court sustained an ordinance that
prohibited picketing "before or about" any residence. 5 ' Although
the law was adopted in response to targeted picketing by anti-
abortion protestors of a doctor's home, the Court concluded that the
law was permissible because it was content neutral and narrowly
tailored to protect people's tranquility and repose in their homes. 8
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, said that "[t]he First
Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as
intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable
speech. The target of the focused picketing banned by the . . .
ordinance is just such a 'captive.' The resident is figuratively, and
perhaps literally, trapped within the home.""'
The California Privacy Protection Act says that people, no matter
how famous, should be able to shut their door and close out the
media and the world. If the image could not have been gained
except through a trespass, the media should not be able to obtain it
through technological enhancement equipment. Simply put, the law
is constitutional because it substantially advances the government's
interest in safeguarding privacy in the home.
Thus the protection for the press in newsgathering is surely not
absolute. However, there is a need for express judicial protection
and the intermediate scrutiny test would accomplish this objective.
IV. CONCLUSION
In few areas of constitutional law is there a greater divergence
between rhetoric and reality than the difference between the
Supreme Court's proclamation of the need to protect newsgathering
and its failure to do so. Recent cases, such as Food Lion and
Sanders, show that courts continue to fail to provide First Amend-
ment protection for newsgathering.
154. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1698 (1999).
155. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
156. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
157. Id. at 488.
158. See id. at 482.
159. Id. at 487.
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In this article, I have argued for such protection. It will help to
ensure that the press can perform its essential functions in the
American system of democracy.

